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Abstract  
This paper models a growing city, and focuses on investment decisions and consequent 
patterns of land use and urban density. We distinguish between formal and informal sector 
construction. The former can be built tall (at a cost), but structures once built are durable and 
cannot be modified. Investments are based on expectations about future growth of the city. In 
contrast, informal structures are malleable and do not involve sunk costs. As the city grows 
areas will initially be developed informally, and then formally; formal areas are redeveloped 
periodically. This process can be hindered by land right issues which raise the costs of 
converting informal to formal sector development. The size and shape of the city are sensitive 
to the expected returns to durable investments and to the costs of converting informal to 
formal sector usage. We take the model to data on the built environment for Nairobi, to study 
urban growth and change between 2004 and 2015 in a context where population is growing at 
about 4% a year. We study the evolution of building footprints and heights, development at 
the fringe, infilling, and redevelopment of the formal sector. 
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1. Introduction
This paper examines housing development and redevelopment in a growing city. Our focus is 
a city in a developing country, containing both formal and informal housing sectors.  We look 
at formal sector development and redevelopment, at the allocation (and misallocation) of land 
between sectors, at the transition between the two, and at the role of property rights and 
expectations in altering paths of urban development. We develop a model of a growing city in 
which buildings are durable and investment decisions are taken on the basis of expectations 
about the future growth of the city.  The work builds on the standard monocentric urban 
model and its dynamic extensions (e.g. Braid 2001).  However, most of the urban literature is 
essentially static – and designed to analyse slowly changing developed country urban areas.  
The objective of this paper is to capture key features of developing country cities. The paper 
takes the model to the data for Nairobi, constructing an unusual data set on the built 
environment in 2004 and 2015, and using it to track the physical transformation of a city 
which shares common features with other cities in developing countries. 
The features captured in the model are as follows. First, the city is growing in both population 
and area.  This means that land rents and patterns of land use are changing through time. 
Second, the city contains ‘formal’ or modern structures.  Formal buildings involve sunk 
capital costs, can be built tall, and are hard to modify once constructed.  Since they are 
durable, investment decisions are based on expectations about future land rents, as driven by 
future incomes and populations. As the city grows there will be periodic demolition and 
redevelopment of formal areas.  Third, the city may also contain informal, or slum structures. 
Given the technology and materials used in construction, these building are not likely to be 
built tall, but they can be rebuilt and adjusted after their initial construction; we suppose that 
capital used in such structures is not sunk, but remains perfectly malleable.  Finally, and 
critical to some of our results, there is a cost of conversion of informal to formal land use that 
varies over time and even across properties in the city. 
We show that as the city grows land will initially be developed with informal structures 
which are then replaced by formal structures, which will themselves be subject to intermittent 
redevelopment.  The share of urban population in informal structures will generally decline 
through time.  This decline need not be driven by growth of household income: it is instead a 
consequence of rising land values (and hence a greater return to achieving density by building 
upwards) as the city expands. Heterogeneity of conversion costs means that informal 
structures may be very persistent, existing alongside formal structures, and having long-
lasting implications for the fabric of the city. 
In taking the model to the data for Nairobi, we know the counts and footprint of buildings 
throughout the urban area for 2004 and 2015 based on tracings of all building polygons from 
aerial photos. For 2015 we also know heights of these buildings based on LiDAR data. We 
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have high resolution satellite data for 2004 and 2013, from which roads and buildings and 
neighbourhoods can be extracted by both human and machine counts. We use primarily the 
polygon and LiDAR data set to analyse how Nairobi transforms from 2004 to 2015 at all 
locations, tracing demolition, redevelopment, and in-fill. We also have two sources of data on 
housing and land rents, by location and for a single point in time, and have classifications of 
formal and ‘slum’ areas. 
Nairobi conforms to the model predictions that (1) in the formal sector, house rents and land 
prices decline with distance to the centre; (2) building heights decrease with distance to the 
centre; (3) heights in slum areas are much lower than in the formal sector near the centre and 
lower throughout; (4) between 1-6 kms from the centre there was major redevelopment 
between 2004 and 2015 of formal sector buildings into higher new buildings;  (5) expansion 
of the informal sector is towards the city fringe, with intensive demolition very near the 
centre; and (6) there is widespread intensification of land use, especially on the city fringes 
with infill of new buildings . We find that development of the informal into formal sector 
housing mid-city over the 11 years is slow. We explore the cost of converting informal to 
formal use in the institutional context of Nairobi, to suggest there are high costs of conversion 
in traditional slums near the centre in Nairobi, meaning that some land is not in highest and 
best use, with a commensurate welfare loss.  
There are four novel aspects to the paper. First is the modelling. While Baird (2001) has a 
dynamic monocentric model with durable capital, no dynamic model deals with informality, 
conversion costs, and expectations. Second are the data. While, there is work on the USA 
using demographic census data to try to analyse redevelopment over of periods of time 
(Rosenthal and Brueckner, 2009), the work does not utilize data on buildings, with 
demolition, redevelopment, and intensification (infilling). As far as we know we are the first 
to utilize changes in direct building information to detail the changes in the urban landscape. 
Third, we focus on a major developing country city, where population growth is much more 
rapid than in developed countries and where land market institutions are weak. Fourth are the 
policy aspects where, in a general equilibrium context, we can think about the role of 
expectations and conversion costs, and for the latter make inferences from the data about the 
impact on city development.     
The analytical framework makes clear some of the risks faced by a growing city, and the role 
of policy in addressing these risks.  Expectations are fundamentally important in investment 
decisions, and low expectations of the future development of the city have a major impact in 
distorting investment levels below their efficient levels.  And there are other market failures 
that deter investment, such as inappropriate regulation and land titling or capital market 
imperfections.  The consequences of such imperfections are long-lasting, given the durability 
of structures.   
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The paper is organised as follows.  The basic model and core theoretical results are set out in 
section 2. Section 3 turns to data and analysis of Nairobi. Section 4 looks specifically at 
Nairobi slums, conversions costs, and misallocation. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Theory
In this section we set out the model of a growing city, focusing on investment decisions and 
consequent patterns of land use and urban density.  The analysis is initially developed 
assuming that prices of housing are exogenous, although changing through time.  We then 
show how prices can be endogenised in a full urban equilibrium.   
2.1  Land development: 
We consider the problem of developing a particular unit of land, denoted x (which can be 
thought of as a measure of location and will later be interpreted as distance to the CBD).  
Developers can use two alternative building technologies, informal or formal, denoted by 
subscripts i = I, F, to build housing with floor-space hi per unit land.  More floor-space can be 
achieved either by building high, or by increasing building footprint per unit area. In the 
theory section we will refer to hi as height. In the empirical section we look at each separately 
and derive a measure of building volume per unit area (which, given ceiling height, is 
proportional to floor space).   
At some date (say time 0) the present value of earnings from a unit of land at x that has not 
yet been developed is 
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The first term is the present value of rent from undeveloped land (flow rent r0 which we take 
to be constant), discounted at rate ρ and calculated up to the date of first development, which 
is denoted 0 .  The second term gives the present value of earnings from informally 
developed land.  The price of informal housing is ),( txpI  per unit space and land rent is 
income from selling space, ),(),( txhtxp II , minus construction costs.
1
  Structures on informal
development can be reconfigured at each instant, hence ),( txhI  may vary through time.  
1
  We reserve the word ‘rent’ for income accruing to land, and use the word ‘price’ (per unit space) for housing 
services, although this is a per period flow, not a capital value. 
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Construction costs in the informal sector are a flow, occurring continuously through the life 
of the house; this can be thought of as the rental on the ‘lego blocks’ or iron sheets used in 
construction.  We denote these costs  ),( txhC II , and assume they are increasing and 
convex in height. The site is occupied by informal settlement for time interval 10 , .  
Remaining terms in equation (1) give the discounted value of rents earned over the life of 
formal sector buildings. The first formal sector development of the particular unit of land 
takes place at date 1 , and subsequent redevelopments are at dates ..., 32    Formal sector 
development and redevelopment is ‘putty-clay’: at the time of development, i , a one-off 
construction cost  ),( iF xhC   is incurred, with the building height ),( ixh  then fixed.  At the 
date of the next redevelopment there are neither costs to demolishing the structure nor 
benefits from recycling it back to putty.
2
  The first formal sector development, occurring at
date 1  also incurs a further one-time fixed cost, 1( , )D x  , of converting to formality.  This 
represents the costs of formal road layout, sewerage, power supply etc.  Formal sector 
development requires reasonably well defined property rights, such as land titling or formal 
leaseholds on land granted by the government.  Obstacles to obtaining these rights may be 
substantial, particularly in African countries where much land is held traditionally under 
communal rights. 
1( , )D x  , refers to the combined costs and obstacles, which may vary 
systematically with x or 1 , or may vary randomly through the city. 
Revenue earned on a unit of land formally developed at date i  is ),(),( iFF xhtxp  , ),( 1 iit  , 
with price variable over the life of the development and height fixed at date of construction.  
It is convenient to define the present value of the price of a unit of formal housing space over 
its life, relative to its price at date of construction,  
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This can be interpreted as the value-to-rent ratio on a newly constructed property, since 
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quantity of house on the unit of land.  The numerator is the present value of revenue earned 
on the building discounted to date of construction (equal to the market value of the building), 
and the denominator is revenue at date of construction. 
2
  Building materials in the informal sector have an alternative use, and hence a flow cost to their use in a 
particular structure.  Materials, once used in the formal sector, are entirely sunk and have no alternative use 
value.   
5 
The developer’s problem is to maximise R(x), by choosing building height and dates of 
development and redevelopment. We look first at height decisions.  
Building height: 
First order conditions for choice of height are: 
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Notice that informal sector height is chosen at each instant, ),( 10 t , so does not require 
forward looking behaviour.  In the formal sector the choice is at date of construction, and is 
based on expected future prices.  This is central to what follows. 
It will sometimes be convenient to derive expressions using specific functional forms. We use 
iso-elastic construction cost functions, I
IIII hchC

)( , FFFFF hchC

)( and assume that the 
cost of a single storey dwelling informal building is less than a single storey formal building, 
IF cc   .
3
  However, the elasticity of costs with respect to height is greater for informal than
formal, so FI   .  With these iso-elastic forms the first order conditions for choice of height 
yield explicit expressions for h.  From (3a), for informal development 
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For the formal sector, with sunk construction costs, the first order condition (4a) can be 
written 0)),(('),(),(  iFFiF xhCixVxp   and hence, in the isoelastic case, 
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Dates of development: 
Dates of development and redevelopment are also chosen to maximise R(x).  For the first 
development (which we assume for the moment to be informal), the optimal 0  is implicitly 
defined by 
3
  Because of different building technologies and also because  cI  recurs each unit time, while cF is one-off. 
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This first order condition simply equates flow land-rents on undeveloped and informal land. 
Defining the second of these (i.e. informal sector land-rent at place x at date t) as ),( txrI , (5a) 
becomes: 
      First development, 0 :  ),( 00 xrr I ,       (5b)    
where  )),((),(),(),( txhCtxhtxptxr IIIII  .
The first formal development takes place at date 1  satisfying  
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We define ),,( iF txr   as revenue net of perpetual capital costs at date t on land at x that is 
formally developed at date i  so: 
        Formalisation, 1 :     ),(),();,(),( 11111   xDxDxrxr FI  ,  (6b) 
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The first redevelopment of formal land is at date 2  satisfying       
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Generalising this for all redevelopments gives: 
Redevelopment, i , i > 1:    ),,(),(),( 111   iiFiFiF xrxhxp  .  (7b) 
Equations (7) say that  redevelopment should be undertaken at the date at which the cost 
saving from postponing capital spending, )),(( 1iFF xhC  , equals the revenue gain from 
rebuilding at new height,  ),(),(),( 11   iFiFiF xhxhxp  .          
For iso-elastic construction technologies, I
IIII hchC

)( , FFFFF hchC

)( , we can use the 
optimised values of h in equations (2b) and (3b) in equations (5) – (7) to generate expressions 
for the dates at which sites are (re-)developed.  The date at which site x becomes informally 
developed, 0 , given by equation (5b), is implicitly defined by 
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The date at which informal settlement becomes formalised, 1 , is given by equation (6b)
which using  (2b) and (3b) becomes 
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The dates at which successive formal redevelopments of x take place, i , i > 1, given by 
equation (7b) can, using the iso-elastic functional forms, be expressed as 
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(see appendix for derivation). 
2.2  Analysis: 
What do we learn from the characterisation of development stages given above?  A 
benchmark case in which prices are growing at constant exponential rates Ipˆ , Fpˆ > 0, yields 
analytical results.  The full general equilibrium model that supports constant exponential 
price growth is outlined section 2.3, but for the present we simply assume these exogenous 
price paths.  We look at the time series development of a particular place, x, and then at the 
urban cross-section. 
Development dynamics: 
To draw out results we look first at successive redevelopments of formal areas of the city, 
and then turn to the city edge and informal development. 
Proposition 1:  If construction technologies are iso-elastic, prices are growing at constant 
exponential rates Ipˆ , Fpˆ > 0,  and agents have perfect foresight then: 
(i) The value-to-rent ratio takes constant value V, and the time interval between 
successive formal redevelopments is constant Δτ,  
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(ii) Successive rounds of building are taller by a constant proportional factor. 
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(iii) If the rate of growth of prices is the same in all locations, x, then so too are V, 
 , and height growth. 
The first part of this proposition comes from solving equations (2) and (7c), and the second 
by using this in the first order condition for height, (4b).  The third comes from noting that (8) 
and (9) do not depend on x.  While value ratios and time intervals do not vary with x, the 
actual dates of redevelopment do, as discussed in the next sub-section.  
What about the earlier stages of informal development? The first transition is (we have 
assumed) from agriculture to informal settlement.  This occurs for land at x when the price of 
informal sector housing space reaches the point at which the right hand side of (5c) equals r0. 
The second transition is from informal to formal settlement, and given by date 1  that solves 
(6c).  There is a unique transition date if the return to formal development is rising faster than 
the return to informal settlement (i.e. the right hand side of (6c) increasing faster than the 
left).  If D = 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for this is that )1/(ˆ)1/(ˆ  IIIFFF pp  .  
Since IF   , the condition is met unless the price of informal space is increasing much faster 
than that of formal space.  If D > 0 and non-increasing with time, then this condition is 
sufficient, but not necessary.  A period of informal settlement exists only if the return to 
informal settlement at 0 is greater than the return to commencing formal settlement, 
 ),(),();,(),( 00000   xDxDxrxr FI  .  If not, then initial development will be formal, 
with date 1  implicitly defined by  ),(),();,( 11110   xDxDxrr F  .
Figure 1 pulls these stages together and illustrates the development path.
4
  Building height is
given on the vertical axis (in units that are continuous, but not scaled meaningfully), and on 
the horizontal plane axes are time t and location x (distance from the CBD).  The figure is 
constructed with house prices increasing exponentially with time and falling exponentially 
with x.  We discuss the cross-section – variation across x at a given t – in the next sub-
section, and now look just at the development of a particular location through time, i.e. fix x 
and look along a line sloping up and to the right.  Initially (at low t) this land is rural.  At date
0  (specific to location x), informal development takes place.  The initial height (space per 
unit area) of informal development increases steadily as increasing Ip  causes lego blocks to 
be rearranged.  Formal development takes place at 1  and is associated with an increase in 
4
 Parameters used in the simulation are given in the appendix. 
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height, as indicated by the second step.  Each subsequent redevelopment occurs at fixed time 
interval   bringing the same proportionate increase in height.  The timing and height of 
each of these formal investments is based on perfect foresight about the growth of prices and 
the date of subsequent redevelopments.  Notice that this figure tracks urban height (housing 
floor space) but this, in general, is not the same as population density.  Housing space is more 
expensive closer to the centre, so if demand for space has any elasticity, households chose to 
consume less.  This is captured in section 2.3, which sets out the demand side of the model. 
The urban cross-section: 
We have so far concentrated on a single location, point x, and now place these in the context 
of a city where x measures distance from the CBD, and house prices decrease with distance.  
For analytical results we suppose that this price gradient is exponential with distance, at rates
FI  , , i.e. 
xtp
II
II eeptxp

ˆ
),( , xtpFF
FF eeptxp

ˆ
),( .  Once again, micro-foundations are 
provided in section 2.3. 
With ),( txpI decreasing in x, then (5c), (6c) and (7c) can respectively be interpreted as 
defining, for each date t, the city edge, x0(t), the location of formalisation, x1(t), and locations 
of successive redevelopments,  xi(t), i > 1.
5
  Using these relationships, Proposition 2 states
results on the spacing of different levels of development in the urban cross-section  
Proposition 2:  If construction technologies are iso-elastic, prices are growing at constant 
exponential rates, FI pp ˆ,ˆ > 0 and decline with distance at constant rates 0, FI  , and 
if agents have perfect foresight, then: 
(i) Places at which (re-) development occurs at each date change according to, 
a. IIpdtdx /ˆ/0  , 
b. If D = 0, 
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(ii) The distance between successive formal sector redevelopments is constant, 
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Part (i) follows from differentiating (5c)-(7c) using xtpII
II eeptxp

ˆ
),( , 
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
ˆ
),( .  Part (ii) follows from (i)c with equation (8) for  . 
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 That is, instead of solving (5)-(7) for the date at which a particular location is developed, the equations give 
the location that undergoes development at a particular date. 
10 
Interpretation comes from Figure 1.  The urban cross-section at a point in time is indicated by 
fixing a date and moving along a line sloping upwards to the left towards the CBD, with steps 
in height occurring at distances xi(t).  Moving towards the centre, locations that have been 
urban for longer have been through more stages of development and are taller, offering more 
housing space per unit land. Relatively young/ small cities appear flat, with e.g. just informal 
and first round formal development, while older/ larger cities will contain central areas that 
have been redeveloped multiple times.  
The figure is constructed with FI pp ˆˆ  , and FI   , this giving the parallel lines for
development and redevelopment (see proposition 2.i).
6
  This means that that width of the
informal area, 01 xx  , is constant through time (as illustrated)  and hence the share of urban 
land area that is informal falls with time and as the city gets larger.  Taking a lower value of 
Ipˆ   (so IF pp ˆˆ   and FI   ) then first formal settlement starts sooner (and lower) at each
place, and informal settlement diminishes to zero with time.  Reducing the value of I (so
IF pp ˆˆ   and FI   ) enlarges the informal area, and means that it increases through time, as
it both brings forward the date of informal settlement at each place, and delays formal 
settlement.  
While our analytical results are based on constant exponential price paths, we note that it is 
also possible to numerically compute the perfect foresight equilibrium for more general price 
paths.  These are not reported here, but are work in progress. 
Expectations:  
Analysis to this point has been based on optimisation with perfect foresight. This provides a 
benchmark, but a developing city contains many imperfections, and the first we look at is to 
remove the assumption of perfect foresight.  Recall that ),( ixV  is the value-to-rent ratio on a 
newly constructed property, and equations (8) give the perfect foresight values of this and of 
the expected length of life of the property,  . How do results change if construction 
decisions are based on a value-to-rent ratio that differs from the perfect foresight ratio? 
The solid line on Figure 2 is a slice through Figure 1 at t = 200, maintaining IF pp ˆˆ   and
FI   . Given the parameters used, the perfect foresight value-to-rent ratio is V = 37, and the 
interval between redevelopments is  = 67.  The dashed line is constructed on the basis that 
developers expect a value-to-rent ratio of 28 (imposed at 75% of the perfect foresight value).  
The transition from rural to informal settlement is unaffected by this, but formal development 
is based on these less optimistic expectations.  As a consequence developers build less tall 
6
 Since FI   both the numerator and denominator of (ib) are positive in this case. 
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and hence buildings become obsolete more rapidly, so the interval between redevelopments 
drops to  = 43.  
The welfare cost of this imperfection is measured by its impact on land rents.  Equation (1) 
gives the present value of these rents at a particular point.  Integrating (out to t = 250) over all 
urban areas, lower expectations reduce the present value of land rents by 2.3%.
7
   It is also
useful to have a flow measure by place and time.  For informal development this flow 
measure is simply )),((),(),(),( txhCtxhtxptxr IIIII  .   For the formal sector, land rents are 
the revenue on the vintage that is currently standing minus the construction cost amortised at 
constant rate over the life of the building,  )( 11/),((),(),( iiexhCxhtxp iFFiFF    ,
],[ 1 iit   .   Integrating these over the city gives a time path of aggregate rents.  Lower 
expectations reduce rents once formalisation has occurred, although effects vary with time as 
dates of development are changed, and in some years rents are somewhat higher.  On average 
(out to t = 250), lower expectations reduce total land rents by an average of 2.4%, given our 
parameters. 
Spatial variation in formalisation costs:  
Locations vary in their distance to the CBD and, potentially, in many other respects. One 
possibility is that that the cost of formalisation, ),( txD , varies according to place.  Figure 3a 
illustrates the implications of there being an interval of x within which ),( txD  is particularly 
high.  As expected, this extends the period during which the area is occupied by informal 
settlement.  Several other observations are noteworthy.  First, a history of informality has a 
persistent legacy on the area.  Formal development starts later, and so therefore does 
subsequent redevelopment; this impacts on building height which depends on the price (and 
hence date) of redevelopment.  Importantly this means that the rigid steps of height seen in 
figure 1 will not necessarily apply.  Second, a persistent informal area will see housing space 
per unit area increase through time (perhaps through building taller), so it is possible that it 
may come to have taller informal buildings than surrounding formal areas (although this is 
not the case on figure 3a).   
The present value loss of land rent and welfare, discounted to date zero, along one of the 
rows with high conversion costs (row 15) is just 1.2%, relatively small because losses are far 
in the future.  The flow costs are of much larger magnitude, with rents depressed where 
development has been postponed (for example at point a, with rent 38% lower than in the 
base case) and higher where rents are increased by building taller (a 26% gain at point b).  
There is an analagous pattern in the cross section. Thus point a is at year t = 161; in the urban 
7
  As a percentage of the excess of urban land rent over the rent earned by land in non-urban use, r0. 
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cross-section for that year, this area, locked in informal development, yields 38% less land 
rent than it would have had it been formally developed.  This loss of land rent corresponds 
exactly to loss of urban real income. 
An evolving cityscape in which D(x, t) is random is illustrated in figure 3b.  All locations see 
height increase with time, but initial and subsequent formal development takes place at 
different dates and hence at different times.  This means that gradients of height, density and 
land rents are not monotonically decreasing from the centre in such a city.  The probability of 
a randomly selected formal location being redeveloped in a particular unit of time is 1/Δτ, 
which is greater the lower are expectations (as buildings are built too low) and faster the 
expected rate of price increase. 
2.3:  Closing the model: 
To this point our analysis has focused on construction of the city, given time paths for the 
price of housing floor-space at each location.  We now complete the model by specifying 
household behaviour and hence the demand for space.  This is constructed in a way consistent 
with the preceding analysis, merely offering a model of price growth in terms of growth in 
city incomes and productivity.  This sub-section may be omitted by readers who want to 
move directly to empirics. 
Households: 
At date t a representative urban household living at distance x from the CBD receives income 
net of commuting costs )()( xTtw , where w(t) is the wage at date t (the same for all 
households), and )(xT  is the fraction remaining after commuting costs.  Each household 
makes a discrete choice between formal and informal sector housing and, for the chosen 
sector, chooses si(x,t) units of housing (i.e. floor-space) at price pi(x,t) per unit, i = F, I.  
Utility is derived from the quantity of space consumed, its formal/informal status, and 
consumption of a numeraire good (equal to wage income net of commuting and housing 
costs).   
 
 FtxstxpxTtwtxsu
ItxstxpxTtwtxsu
txu
FFFF
IIII
FI :),(),()()(),,(
:),(),()()(),,(
max),( , 

     (11) 
The quantity of housing space is chosen to maximise utility.  We assume homothetic 
preferences, so maximised utility is  
    )()(:),(),()(:),(max),(
,
xTtwFtxpvxTtwItxpvtxU FFII
IF
 ,     (12) 
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where v is maximised sub-utility from housing.  Free choice of location means that, at any 
occupied location and housing type, utility equals a common city wide utility level, )(tU .  
The price of a unit of housing must be such that this holds, so prices satisfy 
  )()(/)(:),( twxTtUItxpv II  ,   )()(/)(:),( twxTtUFtxpv FF   .    (13) 
These prices implicitly given in (13) define the price schedules faced by developers.  If 
preferences are Cobb-Douglas then   IpIpv : ,     FpFpv   /: .  Housing expenditure 
is share I , F ,  of net income, and parameter 1  captures the fact that formal housing may 
offer higher utility than informal. With this Cobb-Douglas assumption, prices of formal and 
informal housing satisfy  
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Constant exponential growth of the price of space is achieved by assuming that urban wages 
relative to outside utility grow at constant rate g.  Similarly, constant exponential decline with 
respect to distance is achieved by the share of income net of commuting declining with 
distance at rates FI TT
ˆ,ˆ , so   Ii tUewtxp xTgti
/1ˆ
)(/),(
 , i = I, F.  This gives prices rising at 
constant rates II gp /ˆ  , FF gp /ˆ   , and declining with distance,  III T  /
ˆ ,
FFF T  /
ˆ .
As well as giving choice of housing type and location, these preferences also generate 
quantities of housing demand per household.  They are, by Roy’s identity, 
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In the Cobb-Douglas case, 
),(/)()( txpxTtws IIII    ,         ),(/)()( txpxTtws FFFF  .     (14a) 
Labour and population: 
To complete the model, we note that population at a point is h/s, total floor area supplied 
divided by consumption of floor space per household.  Total city population at date t is 
therefore 
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The oldest formal development has been redeveloped the most times (which, at date t, we 
denote imax(t)).  Notice that this expression assumes that the city is linear (or a set of rays), 
not a disc; adjustment to (15) to capture the latter is straightforward.   
The final element is to close the model, either by setting )(tU  exogenously with L(t) 
endogenous (open city), or with L(t) exogenous and determining the equilibrium city wide 
level of utility (closed city).  The analysis of the preceding sub-sections follow the open city 
route, with exogenous growth of urban wages relative to outside utility driving housing price 
growth.  
3. Empirical work on Nairobi
The model gives a number of predictions about both the cross section and dynamic aspects of 
the building of cities. As noted in the introduction, we use a variety of data sources including 
high resolution satellite data from two time periods, traced layouts of building footprint 
polygons, and, for later years, building heights. For the first time that we know of, the 
evolution of the built environment of a city can be tracked, as well as the predictions of a 
dynamic model examined empirically. Second the model introduced the notion of conversion 
costs that could be high and could be heterogeneous across the city. For a city such as 
Nairobi, based on “accidents” of history, we have an empirical counterpart: informal 
settlements where conversion costs are high, as well as those where they are likely to be 
much lower. We explore the role of these conversions costs on the building of Nairobi. In this 
section the informal sector is defined as officially designated “slums” and we switch to this 
term. While we proxy the informal sector by slums, it is unclear to us whether slums are an 
over or underrepresentation of the informal sector based on technology and conversion costs. 
In this section we first describe the data in more detail. Then we present cross-section results 
which suggest that Nairobi conforms to the basic patterns we see in a monocentric model and 
that slums present a major issue with very different patterns of rents and usage than the 
formal sector. Then we analyse the dynamics of how Nairobi’s built environment changed 
from 2004 to 2015, both to explore predictions of the model and to highlight slum and formal 
sector differentials. Finally, we focus directly on the issue of slums and potential 
inefficiencies driven by artificially high conversion costs.   
3.1 Data 
We build a data set for Nairobi which defines characteristics of the built environment at a 
very fine spatial resolution for 2-3 points in time from several different sources. Most 
characteristics are mapped into a grid of 150 x 150m square. There are thousands of these in 
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the region; and for the sample we focus on, the 2004 built area of the city, there are 6222 
squares.   
Our main data, which we refer to as footprint data, is building footprint or roof coverage 
based on tracing of buildings from aerial photo images (at an even higher spatial resolution) 
for 2004 and 2015.  The 2004 footprint data was received by the Nairobi City Council in 
2006 with digitized polygons for every building in the administrative boundary of Nairobi. 
The data are from the Center for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD) at Columbia, as 
far as we can tell mostly based on aerial images taken in February 2003 at a scale of 
1:15,000, with later field identification.  In January 2015, imagery at (10-20cm resolution) 
was recorded.  The key methodological imagery work has been to overlay the 2004 and 2015 
images to determine which building footprints are unchanged since 2004, which buildings 
were demolished with no replacement on the prior site, which buildings were redeveloped 
and finally where and to what extent infill occurred with new building on sites where no 2004 
buildings existed. Overlay is complicated by variations in the way buildings were traced and 
specifically located in 2004 versus 2015, as well as by tracing error. The Data Methodology 
Appendix describes the issue and the algorithm used to overlay and identify types of changes. 
This data is supplemented by building height data for 2015 from LiDAR (0.3-1m resolution) 
which was used to create a Digital Elevation Model and give heights of objects.  We also use 
high resolution SPOT satellite data for the years (circa) 2004 and 2013 to measure road 
coverage. 
For Nairobi we use two classifications of slums. For 2004, a copyrighted land use map 
prepared jointly with the CSUD at Columbia, Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the Government of the Republic of Kenya under the Japanese Government 
Technical Cooperation Program was published and printed by the survey of KENYA 1000 in 
March 2005. Columbia categorized polygons as slums if they contained small mostly 
temporary buildings that are randomly distributed in high density clusters, with a statement: 
“It should also be noted that in some cases the JICA maps labelled these areas as slums on the 
map and that is the reason we included it here.  It was hard to categorize slums so this label 
was only used when it was clear that this was the type of land use”  See Williams, et al. 
(2014) for their full methodology.  Second, in 2011, slums were mapped by IPE Global under 
the Kenya Informal Settlements program, and we digitized these maps. IPE mapping of 
settlements was done using satellite imagery and topographic maps with the imprecisely 
defined criteria. The general idea is that slums are “unplanned settlements” which have some 
aspects of low house quality, poor infrastructure, or insecure tenure. The 2011 designation 
has many more slums than in 2004. Most 2011 areas had housing in 2004 not then defined as 
slums; in most cases these areas subsequently experienced enormous infill of small buildings. 
It is clear however that the effective definitions differ across years and cannot be used to 
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distinguish new slums or even slums which no longer exist. We generally work with the 
union of the two and infer slum removal and expansion from changes in the built 
environment in these areas.   
Finally we have cross-section house rent and land value data. We have a cross section of 
georeferenced household level data from the 2012 ‘Kenya: State of the Cities’ survey by the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC). This is the first data set to record household rent 
(with detailed house and some neighbourhood characteristics) in Nairobi for a sample that is 
stratified between informal and formal areas (based on the 2009 Census, yet another 
definition of slums). This allows for a cross section of households that is representative of the 
formal neighbourhoods, and another that is representative of slum areas. Although there have 
been previous studies of household rents in Nairobi’s slums (Guylani and Talukdar, 2008), 
they rely on data restricted to slum areas, and so offer no analysis of the relationship between 
the informal and formal housing markets.  In addition to rent data we have, for 2015 property 
values that have been scraped from property24.co.ke. We focus on the vacant land listings 
with information on asking price and plot area, for which we have information for 80% of the 
listings. These data upon mapping only are found in the formal sector.  
3.2 Cross-sections: The built features of Nairobi 
Standard urban models of the spatial lay-out of cities predict that the intensity with which 
land is used will decrease with distance from the centre, where land values and house rents 
are highest (see Duranton and Puga, 2015 for a review of the literature). We develop 
descriptive regressions and graphs showing the price gradients which drive intensity and then 
analyse measures of intensity such as building cover and volume and building heights, and 
how they differ between the formal and informal sector. But there are a number of 
methodological issues to deal with in the use and mapping of our data 
Mapping Nairobi 
The first step is to define the spatial extent of Nairobi at two critical dates: 2004 and 2015. 
Nairobi’s spatial area is a little difficult to characterize because on the fringes there is some 
degree of sprawl or non-contiguous development and there are also outlying villages near to 
the city. We adopt a fairly conservative definition of the boundary: that for a (150mx150m) 
grid cell to be in the city on the outer edge a smoothed (by 900 meter squares) roof cover 
must be 10% or more of the area. Figures 4a and 4b show the city respectively in dark outline 
in 2004 and in 2015. For each year we mark the slums as recorded at that time: 2004 in 4a 
and 2011in Figure 4b. We also mark the radius in red near the CBD in which there are no 
slums as defined in each time period and the city centre with a yellow star. The city centre is 
the brightest lit pixel in night lights data in the early 1990’s.  
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In either Figure 4a or 4b, we see the intensive margin which is the 2004 city. We focus on 
this margin for examining key aspects of dynamics; our 2004 data do not extend in general to 
the 2015 border. City shape is not a nice regular circle. It is bounded to the south by an 
airport and then a large national park and to the immediate north of the centre by a preserved 
state forest.  Related, the major highways tend to run east-west. We can see also that there is 
a big extensive margin to the city, where city population is growing at almost 4% a year. 
Apart from spread what we take from the figures concerns slums. As the model predicts, 
slums are not prevalent near the centre; and the area with no slums near the centre as defined 
contemporaneously expands considerably between the two years, from a 0.775 to a 2.0 km 
radius around the centre are gone by 2015. The maps suggest considerable slum expansion at 
the 2004 fringe of the city, as predicted in the model. Finally we note the large slum of 
Kibera directly south-west of the centre (ranging from 3-5 kms of the centre). In Section 4, 
we will focus in part on Kibera. 
Land value and house price gradients 
In the model, in section 2, house prices and land values decline with distance from the centre 
because the benefits of lower commuting costs to the centre for those near the centre are 
capitalized into higher willingness to pay for housing locations and thus also for land near the 
centre. These higher values near the centre should induce more intensive use of land—higher 
buildings and more floor space per unit of land built coverage. From NORC we have data on 
house rents, floor space, and house and neighbourhood characteristics; we know house 
location and whether that location is classified as being in a slum by the NORC project. We 
run a hedonic regression of the log of rent per square meter of floor space (as a proxy for 
house price) on distance from the centre allowing for a slum differential. Results are reported 
in Table 1 columns 1 and 2. Column 1 has no controls and column 1 has the controls listed in 
the footnote to the table. Figure 5a graphs how the predicted price per square meter of floor 
space varies with distance from the centre for a standardized housing unit for formal and 
slum areas. Formal predicted prices per square meter of floor space decline with distance 
from the centre, where prices at the centre are 62% higher than at 10 kms out. We stop graphs 
at 10 kms, since observations start to drop off after that and there is a selection bias on the 
fringe in terms of omitting less developed areas where the city could have spread in principle, 
absent barriers of dedicated green space.  Slum unit prices vary insignificantly over space. 
That is a puzzle which we return to in section 4 where we will use the formal sector-slum 
price differentials to infer inefficiencies created by land market imperfections in Nairobi. 
In Table 1 column 3, we report a regression for asking prices of land lots listed in Nairobi in 
the fall of 2015. All but 3 are in the formal sector as we have defined it. Controls include lot 
size and “coordinates estimated” meaning we didn’t have an exact street location just a local 
neighbourhood, which generally indicates an inferior plot.  For a standardized piece of land, 
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predicted asking sales prices per square meter are graphed in Figure 5b. Because land its with 
their limited share in production have to absorb all house price variations, given the price of 
capital doesn’t vary across space, we expect a much larger change in land values with 
distance from the centre. Indeed inferred unit land values are at the centre are 4.35 times 
those at 10kms out.  
Total cover and volume by sector 
The price and land value differentials in Figure 5 drive land use intensity as we move away 
from the city centre. We now present a set of graphs on the raw data to depict how land is 
used in the city and the intensity of that use. The Data Methodology Appendix gives details 
of how we measure coverage and volume for our basic unit of analysis, the 150m x 150m 
grid square, for slums and the formal sector. 
Figure 6a shows the average cover per 150x150 meter grid square at each distance of 
buildings in formal sector usage and then slum usage for 2004 and 2015, all smoothed over 
distance1.
8
 This average roof cover, or building footprint size is the product of two factors—
intensity of cover in each formal sector grid square (to follow in Figure 7) and the fraction of 
grid squares at each distance that are formal (vs slum or empty). The table at the top of the 
figure gives the fraction usage by type overall at each distance for 2015, by dividing the 
numbers in the figure by 22,500.  Figure 6a with its table tell us several things. First, overall 
cover is dominated by formal sector usage. Second, total cover in both the formal and slum 
sectors increases over time especially further from the centre where later we will see there is 
enormous infill. Third, slum cover is close to 0 within 2 kms of the centre, as the model 
would predict. There are next to no slums left there. Finally total cover in both periods—slum 
plus formal sector doesn’t vary much with distance from the centre, or in 2015 even increases 
in parts. The missing piece is road cover. Roads traced from SPOT satellite images suggest 
road cover increases substantially as we near the city centre, as predicted by usage models 
from the 1970’s (Vickery and Solow, 1971 and Riley 1974). Near the centre in 2004 over 
22% of total area was devoted to roads, which declined to 5% at 10kms out.
9
 After 2004,
from about 4kms out, there is a lot of road infill, so that by 2013 at 10 kms the 5% road cover 
in 2004 has increased to 15% 
Figure 6b focuses on our key measure: volume, or cubic meters of built space. In 2015 we 
can directly measure volume, multiplying cover in square meters by LiDAR height in meters 
to give cubic metres of built space. For 2004 we infer height based on the average 2015 
8
 This is STATA local mean smoothing with an Epanechnikov kernel, with default settings. 
9
 This is based on tracing of roads from SPOT images in 2004 and 2013. Paved roads of 1-2 lanes are assigned a 
10m width and 4 lanes a 20m width. This is conservative. And near the centre excludes sidewalks, which are 
less existent further out. Dirt roads are excluded. 
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height of buildings unchanged between 2004 and 2015, in the own and queen 150x 150 m. 
square neighbourhood. Volume tells us about the overall intensity of land use. Total volume 
overall falls dramatically as we move away from the centre in the formal sector; and there are 
big increases over time beyond 1km from the centre. Slum share in volume compared to the 
formal sector and compared to its share in total cover is quite modest. As we will see shortly 
that reflects the low heights of slum buildings. Finally note that while total formal sector 
volume declines with distance from the centre, total slum volume generally rises as does it 
share, again reflecting the greater presence of slums moving out from the centre. Some tail-
off of slum shares after 7 km from the centre we think involves a delay in defining faster 
growing fringe areas as slums.  
Figure 7 examines intensity within sectors. Here we have the same measures of coverage and 
volume by usage at each distance, but rather than dividing by total 150x150m cells in each 
distance ring, for the formal sector, we divide just by all cells with formal sector usage. 
Similarly for slums we divide just by the count of slum cells. There is a modest downward 
bias (about 10%) in both numbers because the 12% of mixed cells appear in counts for both 
denominators. In principle we could plausibly divide mixed cells into proportions slum vs 
formal sector, but when we turn to dynamics with changing slum and formal sector coverage 
within mixed cells, there is no clear way to do this, and bias involved is small.   
Figure 7a reveals what we know on the ground. Within slums, especially traditional slums 
between from 3-6kms from the centre (like Kibera), there is extremely high coverage and 
little green space —slums have extremely high average coverage about 36% in 2015 at 5kms. 
Very near the centre, the much lower numbers reflect slum clearance, discussed in Section 4.  
Figure 7b repeats the intensity in terms of volume. It reveals a fundamental finding. Height in 
the formal sector trumps coverage to generate more cubic meters of space. Throughout the 
city average volume intensity in the formal sector exceeds that in slums in 2015. Volume 
intensity is very high nearer the centre in the formal sector, declining with distance to about 
6kms before flattening out somewhat above slums. Slum volumes are comparatively low and 
flat reflecting low building heights throughout.  
Figure 8 shows directly we inferred by comparing Figures 6 and 7: a measure which 
effectively gives a cover weighted average of individual building heights (see Appendix). 
Heights decline from an average of 23 meters near the centre to about 7 meters beyond 6kms 
from the centre, which is a little under the height (with roof) of a 2 story building. Heights in 
slums are flat at about 5 meters, approximately a 1+ story building with roof. Figure 8b takes 
the NORC data for 2012 and estimates for the sample a Poisson model of the number of 
stories (see Table 1 column 4 for the estimates) in just the residential sector. At the centre 
buildings average just under 5 stories where 5 is the maximum building size which can 
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operate without reliance on elevators (under uncertain power and repair). Heights in the 
formal sector decline to about 2 stories at 10km—lower developments are further out. 
Heights in slums are fairly flat, starting at 1 + stories near the centre and then converging to 
formal sector heights at 10km. As we modelled in Section 2, slums have a different 
technology where height is costly and thus building is low. 
Heterogeneity over space 
We have demarcated everything based on ring averages for distance from the centre. Within 
distance rings there is considerable heterogeneity in the face of strong patterns in ring 
averages. To show the heterogeneity, we map 2015 average height and total volume per 
150x150 grid square for slum and formal sector areas throughout the 2004 city area from 
Figure 4a. Figure 9a shows the height map. The formal sector is in blue, with intensity linked 
to darker shades. The city has a monocentric look with intense heights at the centre, dropping 
quickly going away from the centre. Throughout the rest of the city there are scatterings and 
modest clusters of higher heights, but nothing comparable to the centre. Slums generally have 
low height throughout; see especially Kibera southwest of the centre. We note some other 
details about the map. Green spaces in the city include a large (to the north east) military 
airport, the Presidential palace which is not well mapped (and unmapped in 2004) and a large 
golf course. As noted above to the south there is the main airport just outside the boundary 
and then the national park; and to the north there is the dark green protected forest. Finally we 
note to the south in the far-east is a cluster of “slum buildings” with noticeable height. 
Visually in satellite images, these look like formal sector apartment buildings, an issue of 
misclassification. Figure 9b shows volume, which displays more heterogeneity and reflects 
land use details missing from the model. While the centre remains distinct, we note there are 
large volume areas on the city outskirts especially to the east. These are generally grid 
squares covered with warehouses and other large flat commercial or industrial buildings, an 
added complexity in thinking about land use in cities. 
3.3 Specifics of dynamic development 
Measurement and definitions 
In the prior section we looked at the 2004 and 2015 cross-sections which themselves imply 
by comparison some dynamics of development. Here we overlay our images and break down 
the changes in total cover and volume within sectors between 2004 and 2015 into change due 
to demolition (with no replacement), infill, and net redevelopment. Demolition is a building 
in 2004 where there is no building in 2015, so demolished coverage is lost 2004 cover. We 
think of demolition as a cousin to redevelopment: spaces cleared but yet to be built upon (or 
space turned into roads). Infill is new buildings which do now overlap with any 2004 
buildings. Net redevelopment involves a 2004 building which has been replaced by a 2015 
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building(s) overlapping the 2004 footprint. Net redevelopment takes coverage in the new 
2015 buildings and subtracts the coverage of old 2004 buildings for each 150 x150 meter 
square.  Net volume redevelopment again assigns heights in 2004 based on neighbourhood 
averages for unchanged buildings and uses 2015 height information on the new buildings.  
So far in displaying patterns by distance from the centre we have used averages for the 
population raw data at each distance. We do the same here in figures, except for figures we 
convert to fractions, relative to initial cover or volume. In a distance ring, for cells in formal 
sector use, by what fraction did overall formal cover or volume decrease or increase due to, 
say, demolition or infill? We also run regressions. Here we can’t do fractions because of a 
problem of initial zero cover (so no defined fraction) or tiny coverage (yielding astronomical 
fractions) in many cells. We run total change in any cell on distance rings from the centre 
with a control for initial coverage or not and extent of coverage, as well as other controls.
10
Tables 2-5 report the predicted infill, redevelopment and demolition (with standard errors) at 
each distance for a city-wide standardized formal sector or slum sector grid cell as relevant 
for cover and volume in the formal and slum sectors.  
Results 
We start with formal sector coverage in Figure 10a and Table 2, which have four outcomes: 
net redevelopment, demolition, infill and total change. Our focus is on the distance 
relationship. We plot the distance relationships as fractions of initial cover, while the table 
has distance predicted totals. Throughout, demolition, as redevelopment waiting to happen, 
looks flat and modest, albeit from the table there being more near the centre. Net 
redevelopment of coverage as a fraction is also flat in the Figure 10a, with less right at the 
centre. In the table with total change there is not much difference initially beyond the first 
ring but there is a rise as we get more to the city fringe. Note again coverage change is net: a 
2015 footprint replacing in general a smaller 2004 one. Infill as a fraction in the figure and as 
a total increases sharply with distance (consistent with Figure 6a). In summary, there are two 
takeaways on coverage changes in the formal sector. First, infill dominates the action for 
coverage change. Second there isn’t much change near the centre: the 1km ring around the 
city centre is locked-in during this 11 year interval, with already tall buildings, historical land 
marks and set roads.  
10
 Controls are listed in the tables and include (a) a control on whether there was any building cover in 2004 in 
the cell; (b) if so, the extent of grid cover; (c) if so, average 2004 building footprint size; (d) the measures in b 
and c on average for queen neighbours; (e) own grid square road coverage in 2004; and (f) the fraction of 2004 
coverage in own and neighbour cells which are slums.  
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As before, the most compelling measure involves volume—cubic meters of space which we 
take to be closely correlated with floor space. Figure 10b and Table 3 show inferred volume 
changes in the formal sector by source. Here is where we see the redevelopment process 
analysed in the model. What is immediately apparent is that, in contrast to coverage, infill no 
longer dominates as the source of change up to 4-5kms from the centre. It is redevelopment 
of existing buildings into new office towers and apartment buildings with high volumes for 
the time interval we see in Nairobi. There are higher volumes as fractions or totals from 
redevelopment up to about 4kms from the centre. After 4-5 kms, volume changes from 
redevelopment vary little with distance. Again up to 4-5 kms, we have height trumping 
coverage, now within the formal sector. 
The height differentials for infill, redevelopment and unchanged buildings in the formal 
sector in 2015 are shown in Figure 12. Redevelopment heights between 1 and 6 kms out are 
higher than either for unchanged or infill buildings, as the model predicts. Right near the 
centre, redevelopment is at a lower height than existing buildings. We think this occurs 
because it is difficult to find enough contiguous land and buildings ready for demolition in 
order to have enough of a footprint to put up a tall building. Near the centre with limited and 
scattered vacant space in 2004, infill is done with low building height, rather than new office 
towers. It is comes disproportionately near the centre from parking lot infill. 
11
.
Coverage change in slums compared to the formal sector has some distinct differences in 
Figure 11a and Table 4. There is relatively a lot of demolition near the centre as old slums are 
torn down, we assume in anticipation of redevelopment. Second, net redevelopment in slums 
is pretty flat throughout the city until the fringes. Finally, for the total change as a fraction of 
initial coverage, there is a lot more action in the formal sector than defined slums, reflecting a 
lower opportunity for in-fill in slums with already intense coverage.  
For slums coverage and volume patterns are similar throughout (given little spatial variation 
in heights of slum buildings), given pretty invariant heights. Volumes are given in Table 5 
and Figure 11b. We do note patterns are somewhat distorted as we will see next in Section 4 
because of cleared slums near the centre.  
4. Slum redevelopment and lack thereof
We have no good way to define what a slum is in 2004 versus in 2015. The official 
definitions in the two time periods do not match up and both contain clear classification 
errors under any reasonable criterion. So it is hard to be definitive about slum change in terms 
11
 Based on random samples of 50 infill spaces at different distances, 32% at 0-1.5kms are parking lots while 
further out it is 10-12%. 
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of adding versus subtracting officially designated slums per se. Instead we simply look at 
what is going on – in terms of demolition, redevelopment and infill – in the union of slums in 
2004 and 2011. So far we saw that slum volumes in typical grid squares tended to rise with 
distance from the centre, while they declined sharply in the formal sector. We also observed 
that remaining slums near the centre are very modest in extent. In this section, we focus on 
what we perceive to be high costs to conversion near the centre which have kept slums at an 
intermediate distance from redeveloping and the opportunity costs of this inhibition. There 
are several pieces to this inference.  
First there is intense pressure to redevelop. Figure 13 and the corresponding Table 6 look at 
the fraction of slum coverage per slum grid square demolished and redeveloped very near the 
centre based on regression coefficients where we can deal with small numbers which get 
smoothed in the figures (and here we avoid the infill fractions). Close in demolition is 100% 
and still high from 1-2 kms. The redevelopment fraction is also somewhat higher at 1-2 and 
2-3 kms, compared to further out.  
Figure 14 repeats Figure 4a to show the substantial house price differentials for a 
standardized unit of housing, where the gap is significantly different from zero until 7kms 
out. This suggests a misallocation represented in the model, based on quality differentials.  In 
Table 1, we saw that the slum price gradient for an average quality house was flat, based on a 
slum indicator variable and that interacted with distance.  In predicting rents for a ‘same 
quality’ unit in the formal and slum sectors, we controlled for many house characteristics and 
some neighbourhood ones. However we think there are unobservable characteristics which 
are generally worse in slums near the centre and better further out and which represent the 
quality differential between slum and formal housing we allowed in the model. The indicator 
variable and its distance interaction capture this. A particular example is very poor 
infrastructure and lay-out within slums nearer the centre, inherited by their development 
decades ago and affected by corruption (see below), while slums further out were developed 
later under different conditions.  
In particular, based on the IPE study, we know the coverage of slum land under government 
versus private ownership. This is given in Figure 15, where near the centre slums are mostly 
government owned while further out they are privately owned. This could mean all slums 
near the centre have been government owned, or that all former private ones have been 
redeveloped. Most of the literature is has focused on these remaining traditional slums near 
the centre under government land ownership. We think government ownership impedes 
infrastructure investment in the land by slum lords, while in private slums returns on 
improving land now and looking to the future can be captured by the land owners. In column 
5 of Table 1, we add an indicator for slum land owned by the government. That has a 
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significant negative coefficient and wipes out the significance of the slum-formal sector 
distance differential. 
12
Slum lands near the centre whose redevelopment is inhibited by conversion costs reflect two 
inefficiencies. First, land is trapped in low quality usage, as reflected in the rent differentials 
by distance. Redeveloping slum lands near the centre would eliminate the low quality 
conditions and generate a welfare gain related to the price differentials.
13
 Second is the
technology difference and inability to build high in slums which in the model is represented 
in land value differentials, which we do not observe.   
We have linked government ownership to high conversion costs, as well as low quality 
infrastructure. Why? To illustrate we consider the literature on Nairobi slums and the specific 
example of Kibera. The 1000 acres in Kibera was awarded to Nubians soldiers in 1912, albeit 
without formal title. They immediately occupied a portion of the land but at independence 
their claims (but not tenancy) were revoked, and land reverted in theory to the government. 
The large portion of Kibera not occupied by Nubians was settled on by others and had titles 
illegally allocated by local chiefs and bureaucrats.  Studies on Nairobi’s slum housing market 
suggest that slum lords who operate housing earn high rates of return despite paying bribes to 
maintain their possessary rights, mostly live outside the slums, and are mostly politically 
connected public officials (Gulyani and Talukdar 2008, Syagga et al 2002, and Joireman and 
Vanderpoel 2011). These political figures, absent a major buy-out of their possessary rights, 
have no interest in redevelopment: the land is not theirs to redevelop; they don’t pay for it; 
and they can’t profit from sale of improved land. However they can run a profitable slum 
business with land in its current use. Cleaning up this mess in traditional slums is the 
conversion cost. When opportunity costs of land get high enough, then these cost may be 
overcome, as represented by the demotion and redevelopment of slums very near the centre 
in Figure 13. But large areas like Kibera look particularly intractable. 
Suppose we take the 1000 acres in Kibera and set its average distance from the centre at 
4kms. Then by comparing unit house prices in Kibera with the formal sector, we can 
tentatively infer potential land values in Kibera to compare with the values under formal 
sector usage, to capture the quality differential problem.
14
  To translate slum prices into land
12
 The ownership base case in the regression includes Nairobi county land, road or riparian reserve, some slums 
which are part government and part private mostly all far from the centre, and uncategorized. Nairobi county 
land is reputed to be much better managed by the local government.  
13
 There is a complication: heterogeneity in the population. Slums with lower quality housing near the centre 
contain low income people (with relatively higher willingness-to-pay for low quality housing). Such residents 
may also have differential commuting costs, with lower willingness-to-pay for access to office jobs in the city 
centre. They may disproportionately work nearby to their residence in the informal sector or commute to factory 
and warehouse jobs on the city fringes. However this also represents misallocation. 
14
 The unit cost function is 
1
1 1 1[(1 ) ]kp A r p
          where from Shepard’s Lemma the share of land in 
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prices, we have to use the same CES unit cost function in each sector with standard 
parameters and calibration based on formal sector house prices and land values in our data. A 
calculation suggests that converting Kibera to formal sector usage would result in a $1b 
(USA) increase in land values. That calculation does not capture technological differences 
between slum and formal sector housing including the lost value from not being able to build 
high (although altering CES parameters to differ for the slum sector so it is more land 
intensive with less substitutability has little impact on land value magnitudes).  The 
magnitude suggest that there is a substantial welfare loss from lack of redevelopment and that 
the surplus in values could be used to buy-out vested interests of slum lords hindering 
formalization of Kibera lands, as well as helping with relocation. One solution might be to 
give longer term residents ownership of their units and land, allowing redevelopers to buy 
them out in a timely (and voluntary) fashion; but that solution would require settling with 
slum lords. 
5. Conclusions
The model and data both suggest that in the formal sector house rents and land prices decline 
with distance to the centre; consequently building heights decrease with distance to the 
centre. Heights in slum areas are much lower than in the formal sector near the centre and 
lower throughout the city. However intensity of land cover within slums is very high.  Slums 
account for a small fraction of total housing space overall at any distance from the centre, but 
a fraction that mostly rises modestly with distance from the centre. Between 1-6 kms from the 
centre from 2004 to 2015 there is major redevelopment of 2004 formal sector buildings into 
higher height new buildings. Expansion of the informal sector is towards the city fringe, with 
intensive demolition very near the centre. We find that there is high intensification of land 
use with infill of new buildings through much of the city especially on the fringes. We find 
that development of the informal into formal sector housing mid-city over the 11 years is 
slow.  
In the model we explore the role of expectations in altering (re)development paths. Under-
estimating future demand growth leads to stunted city heights and spatial size. In the model 
we explore the cost of converting slum to formal use; and in the data for the common 
revenue is 
1s ( / p) (1 )l Ar
   for 
kp the price of capital. Invoking the literature, suppose we set 
0.7, 0.5, and 0.4ls     at 4kms and convert rental prices to house stock values using a depreciation rate 
of 2%, an interest rate of 8.5% and a house value rate of appreciation of 8.5% (the last two based on conditions 
in Nairobi). We use standardized land value and house rent prices (converted to a stock price) data at 4kms from 
the gradients in Figure 4. We solve the unit cost function and share equation to get the unknowns,
k and A p . To 
solve for slum land values we insert the slum unit house value based on the gradient in Figure 4a at 4kms into 
the unit cost function.  
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institutional context of Nairobi, we explore misallocation of land between slums and formal 
sector usage, based of conversion contexts arising from poor institutions. We argue that slum 
‘ownership’ by government means unresolved land right issues and corruption with vested 
slum interests of political figures, with a significant welfare loss.   
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Appendix for section 2 
Derivation of (5c), (6c, (7c) is facilitated by noting that: 
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Parameter values in figure 2 are:  2Fc ,  004.0Ic , 2F , 4I , 04.0 , 02.0ˆˆ  II pp , 
1.0 IF  , 100 r , , 4,5  IF pp . Simulation is done with time running to t = 800, and 
reported up to t = 250.  In figure 3, D=100 or D=5000 (10> x <20). 
Data Methodology Appendix 
This Appendix has two components. The first deals with measures on cover/footprint and volume we 
use to analysis. The second gives the algorithm used to extract unchanged buildings, redeveloped 
buildings and infill from the overlay of 2004 and 2015 depiction of building polygons. 
Measures of cover and volume 
Our unit of analysis is 150x150m grid squares. For calculating cover within the grid square in a usage, 
each of these is broken into 50 3m by 3m cells and use type classified by what is at the centroid of the 
3m square. There are three uses: vacant land, slum area and formal. Each 3x3 square is given the type 
of cover there in whichever time period. For each 150x150 square we sum across the 50 cells to get 
for example total building cover in each type. If for example a 150m by 150m gird has only formal 
sector buildings the square meter coverage can take values of 9, 18, 27, etc. up to 450. And the same 
for areas that are always slums. Most 150x150 squares are either all slum or all formal sector. 
However there are about 12% which are mixed grid squares, for which we record the cover or volume 
of slum and formal separately.  
For average coverage in a grid square in the formal sector, before smoothing in  a year in a given 
distance ring, the total area of all cover in 3x3 squares is summed up for all 150x150 meter squares 
whose centroid falls in a narrow distance ring. That sum is then divided by the total number of 
150x150 grid squares in that distance band. The same procedure follows for slums. For Volume for 
2015, for each 3x3m square which is formal sector, we have the height of the building whose cover is 
over the centroid of that square. So volume for that 3x3 square is 9 times the height in meters of the 
building from LiDAR data. We then sum across the grid squares occupied with formal usage for 
150x150m grid squares in each distance ring and then average by the total number of 150x150 meter 
grid squares in the ring. For 2004 we have no height data. To infer 2004 heights, we use what we 
think is an upper bound on height: the height of unchanged buildings, where we presume demolished 
buildings between 2004 and 2015 are likely to be of lower height than those which survive. To assign 
a height to a 3mx3m square in 2004 in formal sector usage, we take the average height in 2015 of all 
buildings that were there in 2004 for all 3x3m formal sector unchanged buildings in the own 
150x150m grids square and its 8 queen neighbours. Height is the height assigned to each 3x3m square 
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in usage in a distance ring from the centre averaged over all such cells, to effectively get a coverage 
weighted average of individual building heights. 
How do we measure change between 2004 and 2015? For demolition, at the 3x3m level the square is 
defined as demolition if its centroid is covered by a 2004 building which has been replaced by open 
space. Demolished coverage is lost 2004 cover; demolished volume is assessed as before using the 
average height of unchanged buildings in the neighbourhood.  Infill is new buildings which do now 
overlap with any 2004 buildings; a 3x3m square is infill if its centroid is covered by such a building 
on 2015 where there was no building in 2004. Infill cover and volume are assessed from 2015 data. 
Net redevelopment in coverage takes coverage in the new 2015 buildings and subtracts the coverage 
of old 2004 buildings. So for each 150m150m meter square we have for redeveloped buildings, we 
have total coverage in 2004 measured at the 3x3m level (centroid covered by the old 2004 
building(s)) and we have total coverage in 2015 measured at the 3x3m squares (centroid covered by 
the new replacement 2015 building(s)). Net redevelopment at the 150x150sqaure is the difference. In 
general, the same buildings are drawn in 2015 to have modestly more coverage than in 2004 so 
coverage change is likely to be an upper bound. Net volume change again assigns heights in 2004 to 
the 3x3m coverage based on neighbourhood averages for unchanged buildings and uses 2015 height 
information on the new buildings.  
Overlaying Buildings 
We match buildings across time by overlaying 2015 and 2004 building polygon data in order to track 
the persistency, demolition, construction and reconstruction of buildings over time. Since buildings 
are not identified across time our links rely on a shape matching algorithm. For each building, the 
algorithm determines whether it was there in the other period, or not, by comparing it with the 
buildings that overlap in the other time period. 
This task is not straightforward, since the same building can be recorded in different ways depending 
on the aerial imagery used, whether building height was available, and the idiosyncrasies of the 
human digitizer. 
Data and definitions 
For 2004 we use a building dataset received from the Nairobi City Council with digitized polygons 
for every building, roughly 340,000 in the administrative boundary of Nairobi. For 2015 we use a 
similar dataset that was created by Ramani Geosystems using imagery (10-20cm resolution) and 
LiDAR (0.3-1m resolution). We have 2015 data for a wider extent, and consequently many more 
buildings, about 1.14 million. The LiDAR data in 2015 were used to measure heights of objects. With 
use of the aerial imagery and heights in 2015, a 3D model was created by hand, and rooftops extracted 
from this model.  
Here we define the nomenclature that we use. First, a trace is the collection of polygon vertices that 
make up its outline. A shape is the area enclosed by the trace, and it can be thought of as a 
representation of the rooftop of a building. A cavity is an empty hole completely enclosed in a shape. 
A candidate pair is the set of any two shapes in different time periods which spatially intersect. A link 
is the relationship between a set of candidates in one period to a set of candidates in the opposite time 
period.  
Pre-processing 
Before running our shape matching algorithm we clean up the data sets. First we take care of no data 
areas. There are some areas that were not delineated in 2004, including the Moi Air Base, and the 
Nairobi State House. We drop all buildings in these areas for both 2004 and 2015. We drop roughly 
1,500 buildings from the 2015 data, and 100 buildings from the 2004 data. Next we deal with 
overlapping shapes. While the 2004 data has no overlapping shapes, in the 2015 data there are some 
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shapes that overlap. This is most often the same building traced multiple times. We identify all such 
overlapping polygons and discard the smaller version, until no overlaps remain. We drop about 1,400 
buildings from the 2015 data this way. We also decide to drop small shapes, in part because the 2015 
data has many very small shapes, while the 2004 data does not. In order to avoid complications of 
censoring in the 2004 data, we simply drop all shapes that have an area of less than 1m
2
. We drop 2 
small buildings in 2004, and 462 small buildings in 2015. 
Another issue is that buildings are often defined as contiguous shapes in 2004, but broken up in 2015. 
For the majority of buildings we cannot aggregate the broken up pieces in 2015 since it is hard to 
identify such cases in general. To match these cases across time we rely on our one to many, and 
many to many matching algorithms defined below. However, in the specific case where a building is 
completely enclosed in another the task is much easier. First, we find all cavities present in each 
period, then we take all building shapes that overlap with the cavities in the same time period. After 
identifying all shapes that intersect a cavity, we redefine both shapes, the original shape containing the 
cavity and the shape intersecting it, as a single new shape.  
Shape Matching Algorithm 
After the pre-processing of each cross-section is complete, we run our shape matching algorithm to 
establish links between buildings across time periods. For any given building we consider 5 possible 
scenarios; that it has a link to no building, that it has a link to one building (one to one match), that it 
has a link to multiple buildings (one to many), that it is part of a group of buildings that match to one 
building (many to one), or that it is a part of a group of buildings that matches to a group of buildings 
(many to many). We follow and approach similar to Yeom et al (2015) however, due to the inherent 
difficulty of inconsistent tracings we contribute to their method by introducing the one to many and 
many to many approaches. We assign each link a measure of fit that we call the overlay ratio. We then 
choose optimal links based on the overlay ratio. Finally, we categorize links as matched or not using a 
strict cut-off on the overlay ratio of 0.5. Other cu-offs such as 0.4, 0.6 and 0.7 produced more errors in 
categorization. 
Candidates 
For all buildings A in the first time period, and B in the second time period we identify the set of 
candidates: 
                        
For each candidate pair we find the ratio of the intersection area over the area of each shape, so if 
shapes A and B intersect, we find     
         
       
 and     
         
       
We link all shapes which do not belong to a candidate pair to the empty set. 
One to One Matching 
First we consider candidate pairs to be links on their own. For each pair, we calculate the overlay ratio 
as the intersection area over union area, so if A and B are candidate pair, we find: 
    
         
         
 
         
                         
One to Many Matching  
For each time period separately, we identify all candidate pair links for which their intersection to area 
ratio is above threshold  . For shape A we define a group            . Now we calculate the 
overlay ratio of one to many links as the intersection area over union area ratio: 
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Many to Many Matching 
Here we have two cases, one when the shapes are fairly similar, which we capture in previous sections 
(one to one, or many to one). The other is inconsistent shapes that form the same structure. To capture 
these we consider both time periods at the once, we clean the candidate pair list, keeping links for 
which either ratio is above a threshold   : 
                             
 Then we condition to only keep shape for which the total ratio intersection is above threshold   , so 
shape A will be included if                      . Now we are left with a new candidate list, 
which we convert to sets                and start merging them: 
                                                                 
We keep doing this until we can no longer merge any two rows. At this point we calculate the overlay 
ratio of many to many links as the intersection area over union section ratio: 
    
                 
                 
ICP Translation 
We encounter a problem when the two shapes or groups of shapes are similar but do not overlap well, 
this usually stems from the angle at which the images were taken, and is especially prevalent with tall 
buildings. To address this issue, we translate one trace towards the other, and then recalculate the 
overlay ratio. As in Besl and McKay (1992), we use the iterative closest point (ICP) method to 
estimate this translation. To perform the ICP we ignore any cavity points as we found they often cause 
less suitable translation. We found that for similar shapes this will optimize the intersection area. 
Optimal Linking 
In the end, we rank all links by their overlay ratio. We iteratively keep the link with the highest 
overlay ratio, or discard it if at least one of the buildings in the link has already been confirmed in a 
separate link. From the list of optimal links, we define a link to be a match if its overlay ratio, or the 
overlay ratio after ICP translation is above 0.5. We then define all matched candidates as unchanged, 
and the remaining candidates as redeveloped. All buildings that were not considered as candidates are 
defined as infill, if from 2015, and demolished, if from 2004. 
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Figure 1:  Urban development with perfect foresight 
Figure 2: Expectations: height profile of city at t = 200. 
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Figure 3a: Costs of formalisation 
Figure 3b:  Random variation in formalisation costs 
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Figure 4  City shape a. City in 2004
b. City in 2015
35 
Figure 5. House rents and land prices for standardized units 
a. House rents per sq meter square
b. Land prices per square meter land
36 
Figure 6  Average (over all grid squares): cover and volume per grid square 
a. Cover
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2015,  avg. 
fraction grid 
sq. cover in: 
Formal 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 
slum 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 
b. Volume
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2015, ratio slum 
to formal  : vol.  
0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.18 
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Figure 7 Intensity within usage: Average grid square within each usage 
a. Cover
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Fraction in 
sector grid 
sq covered 
Formal 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 
slum 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 
b. Volume
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Slum to formal 
vol. intensity  
0.16 0.40 0.51 0.65 0.88 0.94 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.64 
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Figure 8 Average heights 
a. Overall for city: Average in meters (weighted by cover) [city building data]
b. Predicted height: Residential, count of floors [NORC data]
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Figure 9  Maps of city height and volume 
a. Height
b. Volume
40 
Figure 10: Cover and volume change decomposition: formal sector 
a. Cover
b. Volume
Figure 11 Cover and volume changes, slums 
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a. Cover
a. Volume
Figure 12. Height comparisons: Infill, redevelopment, versus unchanged 
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Figure 13. Slum clearance and redevelopment 
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Figure 14. The formal sector-slum rent gap per sq m of standardized housing 
Figure 15. Slum ownership 
44 
Table 1. Prices, values and 
heights (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln house rent 
per m-sq 
Ln house rent 
per m-sq 
Ln house rent 
per m-sq 
Ln land value 
(KSh/m-sq) 
Poisson on 
#Floors 
main 
Distance to Centre -0.0748*** -0.0503*** -0.0501*** -0.152*** -0.0735*** 
(0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0151) (0.0182) 
Slum=1 -1.422*** -0.643** -0.273 -1.369*** 
(0.246) (0.261) (0.279) (0.228) 
Slum=1 X Distance to Centre 0.122*** 0.0615** 0.0317 0.129*** 
(0.0315) (0.0302) (0.0322) (0.0288) 
On Government Land=1 X Slum=1 -0.319** 
(0.153) 
On Private Land=1 X Slum=1 -0.0851 
(0.145) 
Lot size -0.0276*** 
(0.00829) 
Coordinates estimated=1 -0.320** 
(0.124) 
Constant 6.223*** 5.952*** 5.922*** 10.74*** 1.432*** 
(0.166) (0.570) (0.566) (0.103) (0.169) 
Controls No Yes Yes No No 
Listing Month No No No Yes No 
Observations 1008 928 928 561 1111 
R-squared 0.121 0.290 0.302 0.570 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Controls Include:  Ln EA Population Density ln(people/km-sq); Tenancy agreement is written formal; Number of Bath 
Rooms; Piped water to dwelling; Piped water within 50m; Toilet facility in house; Connected to Electricity; Wall is 
made from iron sheet or tin; Wall is made from brick stone or block; Roof is made from iron sheet; Floor is made 
from earth or clay; Access road is paved or tarmacked; Access road is gravel; Dwelling or room in multi-story ; Piped 
water to dwelling; One flood in recent rainy season; 2-3 floods in recent rainy season; 3+ floods in recent rainy 
season; # Floors; 
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Table 2 Change (04-15) in Formal Cover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Change Infill Net Redeveloped Demolished 
km to Center Bin=0 542 466 165 -130 
(88) (63) (43) (25) 
km to Center Bin=1 683 499 318 -177 
(58) (39) (38) (20) 
km to Center Bin=2 943 602 386 -142 
(50) (35) (26) (10) 
km to Center Bin=3 1152 689 520 -161 
(46) (32) (27) (10) 
km to Center Bin=4 1278 835 464 -156 
(59) (44) (26) (15) 
km to Center Bin=5 1385 898 470 -105 
(69) (53) (27) (9) 
km to Center Bin=6 1420 937 496 -115 
(74) (54) (30) (9) 
km to Center Bin=7 2006 1467 606 -162 
(100) (83) (31) (18) 
km to Center Bin=8 2273 1635 616 -115 
(99) (84) (41) (11) 
km to Center Bin=9 2717 2112 569 -111 
(137) (123) (34) (13) 
km to Center Bin=10 2327 1700 772 -48 
(151) (133) (45) (7) 
km to Center Bin=11 3305 1911 1296 -65 
(177) (118) (77) (11) 
km to Center Bin=12 4417 3197 1118 -75 
(696) (581) (200) (37) 
Observations 5697 5697 5697 5697 
R-Squared 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.04 
Controls Include:  Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Fraction of Cell that is Roof Cover in 2004; 
Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell; Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0; 
Fraction of Cell that is Road Cover 2004; Fraction of 2004 Cover in Cell and Queen Neighbours that 
is Slum; Fraction of Cell and Queen Neighbours that is Roof Cover; Average Size of 2004 Buildings in 
Cell and Queen Neighbours; 
Note - sample is for gridcells that have some formal cover in 2004 or 2015 
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Table 3. Change (04-15) in Formal Volume 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Change Infill Net Redeveloped Demolished 
km to Center Bin=0 8952 2465 4307 -2327 
(4059) (691) (1765) (455) 
km to Center Bin=1 12682 4804 8174 -1829 
(1713) (682) (1256) (240) 
km to Center Bin=2 13199 5697 7401 -1214 
(993) (499) (632) (89) 
km to Center Bin=3 17109 6557 10547 -1452 
(930) (431) (695) (105) 
km to Center Bin=4 16277 7571 7957 -1216 
(942) (470) (634) (104) 
km to Center Bin=5 12410 6827 4923 -739 
(824) (499) (420) (61) 
km to Center Bin=6 12493 6758 5507 -778 
(836) (492) (465) (64) 
km to Center Bin=7 14179 9058 5358 -1140 
(900) (612) (406) (142) 
km to Center Bin=8 18862 11446 6807 -788 
(1116) (706) (684) (74) 
km to Center Bin=9 22056 16089 5249 -803 
(1753) (1385) (582) (111) 
km to Center Bin=10 14274 9339 4966 -300 
(1060) (799) (409) (55) 
km to Center Bin=11 19090 9194 7433 -403 
(1470) (704) (677) (77) 
km to Center Bin=12 19280 11824 5191 -451 
(4486) (2966) (1353) (160) 
Observations 5696 5677 5696 5696 
R-Squared 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 
Controls Include:  Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Fraction of Cell that is Roof Cover in 2004; 
Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell; Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0; 
Fraction of Cell that is Road Cover 2004; Fraction of 2004 Cover in Cell and Queen Neighbours that is 
Slum; Fraction of Cell and Queen Neighbours that is Roof Cover; Average Size of 2004 Buildings in 
Cell and Queen Neighbours;        Note - sample is for gridcells that have some formal cover in 2004 
or 2015 
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Table 4. Change (04-15) in Slum Cover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Change Infill Net Redeveloped Demolished 
km to Center Bin=0 668 -230 549 -342 
(270) (196) (64) (57) 
km to Center Bin=1 936 454 488 -236 
(215) (165) (81) (59) 
km to Center Bin=2 1817 697 614 -27 
(164) (101) (108) (27) 
km to Center Bin=3 1803 1067 465 -144 
(162) (127) (44) (28) 
km to Center Bin=4 1837 784 661 -96 
(135) (68) (57) (19) 
km to Center Bin=5 2329 1114 730 -125 
(183) (123) (61) (44) 
km to Center Bin=6 1622 1020 436 -99 
(163) (110) (46) (23) 
km to Center Bin=7 1648 882 635 -140 
(115) (81) (39) (16) 
km to Center Bin=8 1528 850 519 -202 
(144) (106) (48) (29) 
km to Center Bin=9 786 524 236 -189 
(201) (149) (45) (48) 
km to Center Bin=10 2509 1559 1140 -69 
(249) (198) (96) (10) 
km to Center Bin=11 1600 836 656 -146 
(241) (150) (96) (29) 
km to Center Bin=12 1744 136 1212 -80 
(120) (81) (39) (23) 
Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272 
R-Squared 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.05 
Controls Include:  Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Fraction of Cell that is Roof Cover in 2004; Dummy=1 if Cover 
2004 > 0 X Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell; Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0; Fraction of Cell that is Road 
Cover 2004; Fraction of 2004 Cover in Cell and Queen Neighbours that is Slum; Fraction of Cell and Queen 
Neighbours that is Roof Cover; Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell and Queen Neighbours; 
Note - sample is for gridcells that have some slum cover in 2004 or 2015 
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Table 5. Change (04-15) in Slum Volume 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Change Infill Net Redeveloped Demolished 
km to Center Bin=0 1633 1109 1151 -943 
(1067) (896) (561) (278) 
km to Center Bin=1 8100 3923 2280 63 
(2630) (1682) (733) (165) 
km to Center Bin=2 8421 4988 2719 -513 
(935) (758) (320) (130) 
km to Center Bin=3 7180 3237 2838 -424 
(798) (318) (334) (145) 
km to Center Bin=4 10352 5003 3624 -568 
(1077) (696) (383) (230) 
km to Center Bin=5 7287 4202 2143 -564 
(1145) (511) (297) (148) 
km to Center Bin=6 8288 3516 3807 -560 
(716) (351) (315) (56) 
km to Center Bin=7 8582 4151 3959 -1475 
(1015) (634) (478) (338) 
km to Center Bin=8 4618 3365 1599 -1317 
(1472) (1047) (340) (544) 
km to Center Bin=9 10277 6003 5079 -381 
(1224) (863) (508) (65) 
km to Center Bin=10 7018 3312 3095 -639 
(1052) (694) (388) (128) 
km to Center Bin=11 7293 424 5708 -564 
(822) (475) (275) (148) 
km to Center Bin=12 . . . . 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
Observations 1257 1245 1257 1257 
R-Squared 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.05 
Controls Include:  Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Fraction of Cell that is Roof Cover in 2004; Dummy=1 if 
Cover 2004 > 0 X Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell; Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0; Fraction of Cell that 
is Road Cover 2004; Fraction of 2004 Cover in Cell and Queen Neighbours that is Slum; Fraction of Cell 
and Queen Neighbours that is Roof Cover; Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell and Queen Neighbours; 
Note - sample is for gridcells that have some slum cover in 2004 or 2015 
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Table 6. Slum Fraction of Gridcell in 2004 Changed 
(1) (2)) 
Redeveloped Demolished 
km to Center Bin=0 -0.095 0.906 
(0.0370) (0.0363) 
km to Center Bin=1 0.203 0.264 
(0.0629) (0.0970) 
km to Center Bin=2 0.281 0.015 
(0.0435) (0.0223) 
km to Center Bin=3 0.162 0.081 
(0.0165) (0.0173) 
km to Center Bin=4 0.182 0.101 
(0.0161) (0.0173) 
km to Center Bin=5 0.164 0.055 
(0.0143) (0.0132) 
km to Center Bin=6 0.181 0.044 
(0.0174) (0.0104) 
km to Center Bin=7 0.175 0.067 
(0.0117) (0.0123) 
km to Center Bin=8 0.186 0.077 
(0.0157) (0.0118) 
km to Center Bin=9 0.119 0.082 
(0.0216) (0.0230) 
km to Center Bin=10 0.200 0.039 
(0.0208) (0.0097) 
km to Center Bin=11 0.296 0.019 
(0.0415) (0.0216) 
km to Center Bin=12 0.461 -0.088 
(0.0156) (0.0153) 
Observations 1199 1199 
R-Squared 0.12 0.18 
Controls Include:  Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Fraction of Cell that is Roof Cover in 2004; 
Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 0 X Average Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell; Dummy=1 if Cover 2004 > 
0; Fraction of Cell that is Road Cover 2004; Fraction of 2004 Cover in Cell and Queen 
Neighbours that is Slum; Fraction of Cell and Queen Neighbours that is Roof Cover; Average 
Size of 2004 Buildings in Cell and Queen Neighbours; 
Note - sample is for gridcells that have some slum cover in 2004 
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